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Rule 14a-8 appears preferable to the alternative, which permits management to employ corporate resources for social ends without being
accountable to anyone but itself. 94 As the Medical Committee court
said:
[T]here is a dear and compelling distinction between management's legitimate need for freedom to apply its expertise in
matters of day-to-day business judgment, and management's
patently illegitimate claim of power to treat modern corporations with their vast resources as personal satrapies implementing personal political or moral predilections. 95
HARVEY

L.

HANDLEY III

BAD DEBT DEDUCTION FOR SHAREHOLDER-CREDITOR
UNDER PROXIMATE RELATION TEST
Section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for a
deduction for a business bad debt in the year the debt becomes worthless.1 When a taxpayer takes a business bad debt deduction he must
establish that a true indebtedness exists,2 that the debt has become
"See Bayne,

Caplin, Emerson & Latcham, supra note 2.

"'432 F.2d at 681.
1

2 NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166 provides in part:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-

(i) Wholly worthless debts.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which becomes worthless within the taxable year.

(d) NONBUSINEss DEBTS.General rule.-ln the case of a taxpayer other than a
corporation(A) subsections (a) and (c) shall not apply to any nonbusiness debt; and
(i)

(2) Nonbusiness debt defined.-For purposes of paragraph (i),
the term "nonbusiness debt" means a debt other than(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in
connection with a trade or business of the taxpayer; or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is
incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business.
TR.As. RJEG. § i.s66-i(c) (196o), states that only a bona fide debt qualifies for
purposes of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 166:
A bona fide debt is a debt which arises from a debtor-creditor
relationship based upon a valid and enforceable obligation to pay
a fixed or determinable sum of money. A gift or contribution to
capital shall not be considered a debt for purposes of section 66.
See, e.g., Curry v. United States, 396 F.2d 630 ( 5 th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Henderson, 375 F.2d 36 (5 th Cir. 1967); cf., REv. RuL.. 458, 1969-2 Cum. BuLL. 33. For
a discussion of the distinction between debt and equity in corporate situations see
American Processing& Sales Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 842 (Ct. CA. 1967).
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worthless during the taxable year,3 and that the indebtedness was
created in connection with his trade or business.4 When a true indebtedness has been established, the business or nonbusiness nature of the
debt is a question of fact.5 One of the tests applied to determine
whether a debt was created in connection with taxpayer's trade or
business so as to qualify as a business bad debt rather than as a nonbusiness bad debt is the "proximate relation" test.6 Under the proxi'in determining whether a debt is worthless, the district director is to consider
all the pertinent evidence because the worthlessness of a debt is a question of fact.
TREAs. REG. § i.i66-2(a) (1960). See American Processing & Sales Co. v. United States,
371 F.2d 842, 851 (Ct. Cl. 1967); United States v. Collier, 104 F.2d 420, 424 (sth Cir.
1939). For a discussion of the worthlessness of a debt, see Ohl, The Deduction
for Bad Debts: A Study in Flexibility and Inflexibility, 22 TAx LAW. 579 (1968).
'Note 1 supra. This comment deals with establishing the connection of the debt
to taxpayer's trade or business, when taxpayer is a shareholder-employee who has
loaned money to his corporation and thus become a shareholder-creditor of the
corporation. It should be noted that the shareholder who advances money to his
corporation risks having the advance declared a contribution to capital. Note 21
and accompanying text infra. If taxpayer-shareholder's advance to the corporaiton is a capital contribution, it becomes part of his investment in the stock of
the corporation and results in a capital loss under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165(g)
14,731. See also Spillers
if his stock becomes worthless. See 2 P-H 197o FED. TAxEs
v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 530, 532 ( 5 th Cir. 1969). For special problems involved
with worthless securities see 2 P-H 197o FED. TAXEs 14,29o. For other tax considerations involved with loans by shareholders to corporations see Tomlinson v. z66i
Corporation,377 F.2d 291 (5 th Cir. 1967). But see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 385.
Taxpayer has the burden of proving the existence of a proximate relation between his trade or business and the creation of the debt. See United States v. Byck,
325 F.2d 551, 552 ( 5 th Cir. 1963); cf. Spillers v. Commissioner, 4o7 F.2d 530, 534
(5th Cir. 1969); Syer v. United States, 38o F.2d lo9, 1oo (4th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Clark, 358 F.2d 892, 895 (ist Cir. 1966).
5Treas. Reg. § 1.66- 5 (b)(2), Tfl. 6403, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 77, provides that the
question whether a debt is a nonbusiness debt is a question of fact in each particular
case. See Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 1212, 1217 (1941). INr. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 166(d)(i) provides that a nonbusiness bad debt shall be considered a loss from the
sale or exchange of a capital asset held for not more than six months, and subject
to the limitations of section 1211. Note 28 infra. It must be submitted that it is more
desirable for taxpayer to be able to deduct the bad debt from ordinary income as a
business bad debt than to be required to deduct the bad debt as a capital loss. It
is normally the case that it is more desirable to treat losses as ordinary income, than
capital losses, particularly where taxpayer derives most of his income from salary.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b)(2), T.D. 64o3, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 77, provides the basis
for using the proximate relation of taxpayer's trade or business to the debt as a
test for a business debt:
the character of the debt is to be determined by the relation
...
which the loss resulting from the debt's becoming worthless bears to
the trade or business of the taxpayer. If that relation is a proximate
one in the conduct of the trade or business in which the taxpayer is
engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless, the debt comes
within the exception provided by that subparagraph. (emphasis
added)
The Supreme Court indicated approval of the proximate relation test in
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mate relation test, there are two conflicting and somewhat subjective
criteria currently utilized to determine if the relation between a debt
and taxpayer's trade or business is a proximate one: the strict "primary
and dominant purpose" test and the liberal "significant motivation"
test.7
In United States v. Generes,8 taxpayer was president of a close corporation engaged in construction work. He owned forty-four per cent of
the stock and received a salary of $12,ooo per year. His duties as president required him to obtain financing for the corporation and to secure
bid and performance bonds on construction jobs undertaken by the
company. In addition, in his individual capacity, taxpayer advanced
money to the corporation from time to time. 9 Taxpayer executed a
Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (x963). In remanding the case to the Tax
Court the Court in Whipple stated:
Moreover, there is no proof (which might be difficult to furnish
where taxpayer is the sole or dominant stockholder) that the loan
was necessary to keep his job or was otherwise proximately related
to maintaining his trade or business as an employee. (emphasis
added)
373 U.S. at 2o4. In addition to using the proximate relation test, taxpayer may
show he is in the business of promoting corporations or in the business of making
loans. Note 2o infra. Taxpayer is also allowed to deduct as business bad debts those
bad debts which occur in "the course of" taxpayer's trade or business as distinguished from those that occur "in connection with" his trade or business. INT. REV.
CODE OF

1954, § 166(d)(2)(B). See Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193,

205 (1963),

where the Court instructed the Tax Court to determine if the loan in issue was
incurred in taxpayer's business of being a landlord.
7The basis for the significant motivation test was established by the majority in
Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir. 1963), while the basis for the
primary and dominant purpose test was set out in the concurring opinion in
Weddle. 325 F.2d at 852-53. The significant motivation test was adopted in Generes
v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 279 (5 th Cir. 1970), while the primary and dominant
purpose test was adopted in Niblock v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969).
8427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 197o).
9

Generes was also president of a local bank. In Whipple v. Commissioner, 373
(1963), the Court stated that service to more than one corporation might
lend support to a finding that taxpayer was in the business of promoting corporations. Note ig infra. However, Generes did not rely on the "promoter doctrine" for
establishing a trade or business. Note 2o infra. In Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d
669, 670-71 (2d Cir. 1961), the court discusses the meaning of the phrase "in conUS.

193, 202

nection with taxpayer's trade or business," and the concept of losses and expenses
in the Internal Revenue Code. First, a trade or business consists of holding one's
self out to others as engaged in selling goods or services for pay. Secondly, there is
another class of activity which is pecuniarily motivated but not a trade or business.
Finally, there is a third class of activity with no pecuniary motivation. A business
bad debt is designed to alleviate those losses incurred in the first class, while a
nonbusiness bad debt is designed to alleviate some of the losses in the second class
of activity.
A business bad debt deduction was allowed in Trent because he was a corporate
employee engaged in the trade or business of rendering services to the corporation
for pay. 291 F..d at 676.
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blanket indemnity agreement in 1958 with the corporation as applicant
and taxpayer as one of the indemnitors. 10 In 1962, the corporation defaulted on a job and taxpayer was forced to pay the casualty company
an indemnity of $16.,104.57. The corporation eventually went into receivership, and taxpayer, as a subrogated creditor, was unable to collect this amount from the corporation." On his federal income tax return for 1962, taxpayer deducted the amount of the indemnity as a
business bad debt and filed claim for refund through a net operating
loss carryback arising from the unused portion of his 1962 business bad
12
debt deduction.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Generes affirmed the
district court's finding that the bad debt was a business bad debt and
thus fully deductible under section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954.13 The majority adopted the significant motivation test, first
enunciated in Weddle v. Commissioner,14 as the criterion for establishing a proximate relation. The court in Generes upheld the district
court's instruction to the jury that
"Under this agreement taxpayer, as an individual, agreed to hold harmless the
Maryland Casualty Company from any loss sustained as a result of its bonding
the construction jobs of the corporation. At the same time, Maryland Casualty
Company agreed to increase the surety credit of the corporation from approximately
$1,ooo,ooo to $i,Sooooo and to a total credit line of $2,ooo,ooo for all jobs bonded
by them. 427 F.2d at 281. In Putman v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 85 (1956), the
Supreme Court held that the loss sustained by the guarantor unable to recover from
the debtor is, by its very nature, a loss from the worthlessness of a debt. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § x66(f) provides specifically for a deduction for payments as a guarantor of a noncorporate obligation, the proceeds of which are used in debtor's trade
or business, if the debt is worthless. Note 3 supra. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.166-8(b),
T.D. 6403, 1959-2 CuM. BuLu. 77, which deals with guaranty of a corporate debt.
2"In Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 83 (1956), the Supreme Court held that
.... instanter upon the payment by the guarantor of the debt, the
debtor's obligation to the creditor becomes an obligation to the
guarantor, not a new debt, but, by subrogation, the result of the
shift of the original debt from the creditor to the guarantor who
steps into the creditor's shoes.
352 U.S. at 85. This time frame is important to a guarantor attempting to take a
bad debt deduction because INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(a)(1) provides that the
deduction is allowed in the year the debt becomes worthless. The Court in Putnam
stated that the debt is an asset of full value in the creditor's hands because it is
backed by a guaranty. Usually, the debtor is not able to reimburse the guarantor,
and in such cases, the value is lost the instant the guarantor pays the creditor.
"-The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the net operating loss carryback on
the ground that taxpayer's payments to Maryland Casualty Company did not give
rise to a business bad debt. 427 F.2d at 281. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172 provides
that a taxpayer whose business deductions exceed his business gross income can
carry the loss back three years and then forward five years. See 2 P-H 197o FED.
TAxEs
14,560.
"Generes v. United States, CCH 1967-2 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
14325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963).

9754.
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[a] debt is proximately related to the taxpayer's trade or business
when its creation was significantly motivated by the taxpayer's
trade or business, and it is not rendered a nonbusiness debt
merely because there was a non-qualifying motivation as well,
even though the non-qualifying motivation was the primary
one. 15
The dissent advocated adopting the more stringent primary and dominant purpose test espoused by Chief Judge Lumbard's concurrance in
Weddle'0 and adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Niblock v. Commissioner.17
Where the taxpayer-shareholder is a creditor of his own corporation, he can establish a proximate relation between the debt and his
trade or business only if, under either test, he can first establish that
his trade or business is distinct from that of the corporation. 18 Taxpayer's trade or business is not necessarily that of the corporation
merely because he is employed by the corporation.' 9 If he cannot qualify
as a "promoter" or is not in the business of making loans, 2 0 he must
F.2d at 282 (emphasis added).
F.2d at 852-53. Chief Judge Lumbard rejected the significant motivation test
because he felt application of this test will always result in a judgment for taxpayer. He recognized the fact that where a shareholder-employee makes loans to
the corporation, two fundamental motivations will be involved, that of protecting his
salary interest and that of protecting his investment. He concluded that
... to measure the proximateness of the relationship between the
loan and the taxpayer's status as a corporate employee by asking
whether the latter provides a "significant"-although not dominant-motivation is to pose a question which invariably will be
answered in the affirmative.
325 F.2d at 852.
The majority in Weddle imported the notion from tort law that a proximate
cause may be "secondary to another contributing cause" to derive the significant
motivation test. 325 F.2d at 851. Chief Judge Lumbard rejected this importation
because proximate cause embodies objective factors, such as time, foreseeability, and
space, that cannot apply in a dissection of different motivations toward a similar
objective. 325 F.2-d at 852.
27417 F.2d 1185 (7 th Cir. 1969).
"In discussing the development of the meaning of "trade or business," the
Court in Whipple held that taxpayer must demonstrate that he is engaged in a
trade or business. Devoting one's time and energy to the affairs of the corporation,
without more, is not a trade or business, because the taxpayer can be looking for
a return on his investment. However, the Court did not hold that working for a
corporation cannot be a trade or business, but warned that when taxpayer can
establish a trade or business, care must be taken to distinguish bad debts arising
from his own business and those arising from activities peculiar to an investor.
373 U.S. at 201-02.
nWhipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 202-04 (1963); Trent v. Commissioner,
291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. x961). See also Kelly v. Patterson, 331 F.2d 753 ( 5 th Cir. 1964).
'OUnder the so-called "promoter doctrine," taxpayer can take a business bad debt
deduction if he can show he is in the business of buying, developing, promoting and
selling corporations. Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1963). For a
n427
"325
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prove that the creation of the debt was essential to protect his job in
21
the corporation.
In spite of his corporate employment, the taxpayer who is a shareholder-creditor runs the risk that his advances to the corporation will
be declared contributions to capital or nonbusiness bad debts, because
they were made to protect his investment. 22 It is clear that if the debts
are made purely for investment purposes, taxpayer may not take a
business bad debt deduction under section 166,23 because the debt fails
to qualify as being "proximately related. '24 Consequently, the proximate relation of the debt to taxpayer's trade or business becomes difficult to establish when taxpayer has both a job in the corporation to
discussion of the promoter doctrine see Note, Shareholder-CreditorBad Debts Under
Section x66 of the Internal Revenue Code, 75 HARV. L. REV. 589, 592 (1962). Closely
related to the promoter doctrine are cases that hold a taxpayer who is not in the
business of making loans and financing corporations cannot take a business bad
debt deduction. In United States v. Henderson, 375 F.2d 36 ( 5th Cir. 1967), it was
held that not only did taxpayer have to establish that he was involved in a continuous course of conduct of making loans, but that the particular loan involved must
be "proximately related" to taxpayer's loan-making activities.
"E.g., Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. ig6i), (holding that loan,
made by a corporate employee to an employer were "proximately related" to his
trade or business where he would have been fired had he not made the loans).
In Weddle and Generes, which relied on the Trent case, the corporate employees
sought to be treated as though the corporation's demise was tantamount to their having been fired. This "constructive firing" approach is similar to that used in J. T.
Dorminey, 26 T.C. 94o (1956) and Tony Martin, 25 T. C. 94 (1955). See Maloney
v. Spencer, 172 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1949). But see United States v. Worrell, 398 F.2d
427 (5th Cir. 1968). For discussions of the Trent case see Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L.
Rv. 143 (1962); Comment, 39 N.D. L. REv. 121 (1963); Note, Shareholder-Creditor
Bad Debts Under Section z66 of the Internal Revenue Code, 75 HARV. L. REV. 589,
595 (1962).
2An individual shareholder is not engaged in a trade or business by virtue of
his investment. Higgins v. United States, 312 U.S. 212 (1941). If taxpayer were making the loans to protect his investment there could be no proximate relation between the debt and taxpayer's trade or business because there would be no trade or
business. If the taxpayer is looking only for a return on his capital through dividends, interest or other gain, he will be treated as an investor. Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 202 (1963); United States v. Worrell, 398 F.2d 427 ( 5 th Cir.
1968); Kelly v. Patterson, 331 F.2d 753, 757 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Byck,
325 F.2d 551 (sth Cir. 1963).
OWhipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 202 (1963). Many taxpayers argue,
in the alternative, that if the loss is not deductible as a business bad debt, it is deductible under INT. REy. CODE or 1954, § i65(c)(2) as a loss from a transaction entered into
for profit, though not connected with a trade or business, Spring City Foundry Co.
v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934), held that code provisions for losses and those
for bad debts are mutually exclusive. Accord, Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S.
82, 87 (1956). See Stratmore v. United States, 42o F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1970). See also
Walsh v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 389 (4 th Cir. 1963); United States v. Keller, 3o8
F.2d 24424 (9th Cir. 1962); Spillers v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1969).
Note 22 supra.
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protect as well as an investment in the corporation to manage. 25 Evidence of investment management militates against evidence of job
protection so that a problem arises as to what degree of motivation can
be attributed to investment management before taxpayer will be disqualified for a business bad debt deduction.
Accordingly, in Trent v. Commissioner,26 where taxpayer was a
minority shareholder and the possibility of investment management
slight, the court concerned itself with taxpayer's corporate employment
and allowed a business bad debt deduction. However, under Weddle
and Generes, where the possibility of investment management is great,
it would not matter how much motivation is attributed to investment
management so long as taxpayer could show "significant motivation"
in protecting his employment; 27 and that but for his advances to the
corporation, taxpayer would have lost his job. 28 To the contrary is the
primary and dominant purpose test adopted in Niblock,29 and advocated by the dissent in Generes, under which the taxpayer must show
that his primary and dominant purpose in extending a loan to his
corporation was to protect his employment.3 0 Both the dissent in
Generes and the majority in Niblock relied on the concurring opinion
in Weddle, which emphasized the necessity of distinguishing bad debts
arising in taxpayer's own business from bad debts arising out of activities peculiar to an investor concerned with corporate business. 31 The
'See Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. at 204.
11291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961).
"United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1970).
In the Trent case, taxpayer proved he was fired for refusing to make further
loans to his corporation. By the same token, the court in the Generes case stated
that the corporation would have ceased to exist without taxpayer's guarantee. However, in Weddle, taxpayer was not allowed a business bad debt deduction because
it was shown that taxpayer's guarantee of the loan was not made to preserve his
corporate employment; but rather that the loan was obtained at the same time
the corporation agreed to purchase taxpayer's daughter's stock in the corporation.
325 F.2d at 852. But see Treas. Reg. § 1x.66- 5 (b), T.D. 6403, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 77.
which states that the use to which borrowed funds are put is of no consequence in
determining if the relation is proximate.
0417 F.2d 1185 (7 th Cir. 1969).
3°Although a court examines the motive involved in creating the debt, the
relation that prompted that motive must also exist at the time the debt becomes
worthless under the proximate relation test. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b)(2 ) , T.D.
6403, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 77. See Hickerson v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1956). Because of the problems involved in determining when a debt is worthless,
a fact that may not be known until some time after it has become worthless, INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 65i1(d) provides for a special seven-year statute of limitations
for claims for refund based on a deduction of bad debts, in lieu of the three-year
period otherwise provided for in section 6511. For a discussion of worthlessness in
relation to bad debt reserves see Hogan, The Allowance of Bad Debts: A Look
Forward and Backward, 13 Tum. TAx. INsT. 369 (1964).
3'325 F.2d at 852.
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alternative significant motivation test would invariably result in a
32
judgment for the taxpayer and is too vague and ambivalent a test.
It seems that the primary and dominant purpose test requires the
finder of fact to compare, balance, and select that motive which, more
than any other, moved the taxpayer to advance money to the corporation. Under this test, the sole or dominant shareholder in a close corporation who advances money to the corporation would have difficulty in proving his proximate relation. There is usually little doubt
that he desires, at least in part, to protect his investment.33 Unless
taxpayer in this situation can get alternative relief through a Subchapter S election,3 4 or a Section 1244 stock provision, 35 he will probably not be able to get a deduction for the full amount of his worthless
30

debt.

In contrast to the primary and dominant purpose test, the signifi3id. at 853. Also, in Generes and Niblock the advocates of the primary and
dominant purpose test stated that it is the only test that offers certainty without
explaining how. Chief Judge Lumbard in Weddle stated that there are no scales
sufficiently sensitive to be able to ascertain the exact percentage of motivation.
Therefore, he concluded that the court must look for the "main and dominant"
reason for taxpayer's action. 325 F.2d at 852.
"Id. at 852 (concurring opinion of Chief Judge Lumbard).
3'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77. For a discussion of losses under Subchapter
S see Chester, SubchapterS: Operationsand Procedure, 48 TA=.s 592 (1970); Lourie,
Subchapter S After Three Years of Operation, 18 TAx. L. REv. 99, 114-15 (1962).

Section 1374 provides that losses to an electing corporation are treated as though
they were incurred in a proprietorship, which means the losses would pass through
to taxpayer on his individual return. A taxpayer in the Generes situation could get
relief under this section. See REV. Rut- 70-50, 1970 INT. REV. BurL. No. 5, at 9.
3UNT. R V. CoDE OF 1954, § 1244 provides that a loss of section 1244 stock issued

to a qualifying individual which would ordinarily be treated as a capital loss is
treated as an ordinary loss. See Calkins, How To Use Subchapter S and Section
1244 Without Running Into Trouble, 15 WEsT. R s. L. REv. 349 (1964). See also
Spillers v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 530 (5 th Cir. 1969).

-"If allowed a nonbusiness bad debt deduction, the amount of the deduction
would be limited by INT. Rav. CoDE OF 1954, § 1211, under which the most taxpayer

could set off against ordinary income would be $iooo. However, there is no limit
on the number of years available for a carryover of excess net capital loss under
section 1212(b). Part of the policy behind limiting the nonbusiness bad debt deduction to a short term capital loss is that investments and transactions entered into
for profit fall short of the concept of a trade or business and thus do not warrant
as favorable treatment as losses incurred in a trade or business. See Whipple v.
Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963); Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir.

1963). The distinction between investment and trade or business is often difficult to
discern for a shareholder-employee in a close corporation because the motivations of
the shareholder-employee cannot be divided easily between investment and business.
In cases where both motivations are strong, characterization of a bad debt as investment motivated or business motivated is not accurate. Subchapter S and Section
1244 Stock show an effort by Congress not to saddle small business corporations
with classifications and consequences of the large public corporate form. This type
of flexibility should be reflected in the bad debt area. Note 56 infra.
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cant motivation test requires from the taxpayer a lesser burden of proof
and gives a deduction to close corporation shareholders where deductions previously have not been available.3 7 To be proximately related
to taxpayer's trade or business under Generes, his debt must be created
with the motivation of preserving the taxpayer's trade or business of
being a corporate employee. 3s This test seems to disregard whatever
other motivations the taxpayer may have had. Yet, it should be noted
that in Generes there was undisputed evidence that without the taxpayer's guarantee 9 the corporation would have ceased to exist, and
the taxpayer would have lost his job.40 Therefore, the facts bring
41
Generes within situations contemplated in Trent.
42
However, in Stratmorev. United States, in a situation analogous to
that in Generes, the taxpayers were guarantors of notes issued by corporations of which they were shareholders and officers. A business bad
debt deduction was disallowed because taxpayers failed to meet even
the weak significant motivation test. In that case, without the taxpayers'
loans for debt securities, the corporation would have become insolvent,
terminating the employment of taxpayers. However, despite the employment protection motivation, there was no evidence as to taxpayers'
salary43 to determine proximate relation, and there was no finding by
the trial court as to either taxpayers' degree of investment or the
amount of stock held by the taxpayers in the corporation.
"See Note, Shareholder-CreditorBad Debts Under Section z66 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 75 HARV. L. REV. 589 (1962); note i6 supra.
MOThe Generes court, relying on Trent, stated:
... if... the jury could have reasonably concluded that the taxpayer's endorsement was motivated by a desire to preserve his
business of being a corporate employee the jury could have properly
determined that the bad debt was proximately connected with taxpayer's trade or business.
427 F.2d at 283.
OCases cited notes 7 and 16 supra.
'This would amount to a "constructive firing" under the Trent doctrine. Note
16 supra.
4291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1g6i). Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849, 851 (2d
Cir. 1963) stated that the fact that Mrs. Weddle, unlike Trent, did not have to
fear being fired by a superior was not at all conclusive as to what she was trying
to protect; she would have been fired soon enough if the corporation ceased operation. The Fifth Circuit in Kelly v. Patterson, 31 F.2d 753, 756 (5th Cir. 1964), pointed
out that the taxpayer in Trent was a minority shareholder seeking to save his job,
but that Weddle extended Trent to majority shareholders where job protection
motivation could be shown to be significant.
242o F.2d 461 (3 d Cir. 1970).
"42o F.2d at 463-64. Taxpayers did not provide any evidence as to the amounts
of their salaries, which the Court said made it impossible to evaluate the importance
of salary maintenance and increase. However, the facts were stipulated that without
the loans guaranteed by taxpayers, taxpayers' salaries as well as the corporation
would have ceased to exist.
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The Stratmore court refused to adopt either motivation test,44 but

implied it would prefer to balance taxpayers' salaries against taxpayers'
proprietary interests in the corporation in order to determine their motives.4 5 However, the entire court in Weddle rejected this balancing
approach as inconclusive, particularly in light of the many considerations involved in setting an officer's salary in a close corporation.4 6 If a
balancing comparison is appropriate at all, it would seem more appropriate in a primary and dominant purpose test where motives are
also compared and weighed against each other.
The effect of Generes, if followed, will be to lessen the burden of
proof for taxpayers who are shareholder-creditors in a close corporation, and who cannot use Subchapter S or the Section 1244 provisions
to deduct their losses.4 7 The holding of the case appears to require only
that taxpayer must show that he was motivated by a desire to protect
his corporate employment. However, taxpayers who wish to rely on
Generes run the risk of having their bad debt deduction distinguished
on the facts, because evidence was offered that taxpayer had to guarantee the bonds to keep the corporation in business.48 It is not clear
how far Trent and Weddle have been extended by Generes, but the
holding in the principal case shows an effort on the part of the Fifth
"420 F.2d at 463.
'-The Court did not say the comparison would be conclusive but.
Certainly, where both proprietary and employee motivation are
admittedly present, the extent of the proprietary motivation is
most relevant in determining whether there was a "significant"
employee motivation.
Id. at 463.
The dissent in Stratmore agreed that the comparison of proprietary and employee motivation is important. Taxpayer must produce evidence negating the
possibility that investment considerations were so important that the transaction
would have been undertaken even without business considerations. Id. at 469.
46325 F.2d at 851, 853.
4'Notes 34 and 35 supra.
48427 F.2d at 284. In Weddle the deduction was not allowed at least partly
because the money from the loan had been used to purchase taxpayer's daughter's
stock in the corporation.
The Supreme Court in Whipple effectively overruled the line of cases represented by Maytag v. lUnited States. 289 F.2d 647 (Ct. Cl. i96r), and Mays v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1959), wherein taxpayers were allowed business bad
debt deductions, when they were active in carrying out jobs with the corporations
and looking to future improved salary by their advances. See Note, ShareholderCreditor Bad Debts Under Section z66 of the Internal Revenue Code, 75 HARv. L.
REv. 589 (1962) for discussion of Mays and Maytag. It seems that Stratmore would
more suitably fall under this line of cases because the stipulated facts stated taxpayer was looking to future salary when the loan was made.
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Circuit to make it easier for a taxpayer to take a business bad debt de49
duction.
The controversy over the proximate relation test has evolved from
a dispute as to whether a shareholder-employee could be in a trade or
business, as in Trent, to a dispute as to how much weight should be
given to taxpayer's investment interests when he is a corporate employee. Even so, there is one underlying characteristic that is common
to the different approaches to proximate relation-the debt was necessary to keep the trade or business functioning.50
Generes is significant in the evolution of the proximate relation
test because it reinforces the trend away from the older criteria of
establishing either that taxpayer was in the business of buying and
selling corporations under the promoter doctrine or that taxpayer was
in the business of making loans. Instead, Generes tends toward a more
flexible view of debts made in connection with taxpayer's trade or
business. However, in Whipple v. Commissioner,51 the Supreme Court
indicated a limit to the liberal development of the proximate relation
52
test by effectively overruling such cases as Mays v. Commissioner.
There the taxpayer invested in a number of business ventures incident
to his own trade or business for the purpose of creating future income,
and was allowed a business bad debt deduction for losses incurred
through these loans. The Supreme Court in Whipple, however, did
approve business bad debt deductions such as that allowed in J. T.
Dorminey,5 3 where taxpayer lent money to an importer in which he
held stock, to ensure his wholesale produce business a source of bananas.
Without taxpayer's loans there would have been no source of bananas
available to taxpayer. Thus, Whipple approved of business bad debt
deductions where taxpayer is protecting existing income but not where
taxpayer is seeking future income.5 4
An alternative solution to the Generes business bad debt problem
would be to apportion the debt. As the law now stands, the entire
amount of the debt put in issue is either allowed as a business bad debt
deduction or disallowed as a nonbusiness bad debt deduction. It appears
"l'The court in Generes interpreted Whipple as precluding imposition on the
taxpayer of proof of dominant motivation. But see Niblock v. Commissioner, 417
F.2d 1185, 1187 (7 th Cir. 1969).
roIn Trent, taxpayer was fired. In J. T. Dorminey, 26 T.C. 940 (1956), taxpayer
would have lost his supply of produce. In Weddle it was pointed out that Mrs.
Weddle would have lost her job. In Generes taxpayer would have suffered a "constructive firing."
n373 U.S. 193 (1963).
'272 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1959).
c26 T.C. 940 (1956).
r373 US. at 203.

172

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

possible to apportion the debt between the amount required to meet
the corporate operating expenses and the amount attributable to capital improvements or increase in equity.55 This apportionment can be
implemented by judicial construction of section 166 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, holding that section 166(d)(1) and section
166(d)(2) are mutually exclusive only to the extent that portions of a
debt attributable to one section are not attributable to the other.5 6 Apportioning indebtedness in this manner would require looking to the
application of the proceeds of the loan, 57 and would tend to make the
proximate relation test totally objective 58 by shifting the emphasis from
an examination of motives to an examination of surrounding facts.
5WThe Supreme Court in Whipple refused to consider cases such as Trent, but
this has been interpreted to mean approval of situations as in Trent. See United
States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 197o). It appears, then, that most courts
would allow a business bad debt deduction in the Trent situation and disallow a
deduction in the Weddle situation. Thus, for example, if a taxpayer made two
loans in two different years to the same corporation, one under Trent circumstances,
the second under Weddle circumstances, the first bad debt would probably be
allowed as a business bad debt deduction and the second disallowed.
It seems that in a case like Generes where there is only one loan, divisible by
motivation into two categories, the loan can be apportioned. Under INT. REv. CODE
Or 1954, § 274(a)(i)(B), an entertainment facility used primarily in furtherance of
taxpayer's trade or business is deductible to the extent it is related to the trade
or business under section 162, if it first qualifies under section 162. Here is an effort
to apportion an expense between business and personal use. This is an easier
problem because time can be the yardstick to measure the use for business aside
from motivation and other evidence such as extravagance. Cf. TREAS. REG. § 1.274-1
(1954), T.D. 6659, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. li3.
Also, in the analogous case of an office in the home of taxpayer that is used
partially for business and partially for pleasure, the deduction is limited by
apportioning the use devoted to business and that devoted to personal purposes.
See generally 2 P-H 1970 FED. TAxEs

11,519.

51The effect of this holding would be to treat an indebtedness created by a shareholder-employee as two separate debts. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 166(d) speaks in
terms of "a debt." This language does not prohibit apportionment of indebtedness
because the substance of a transaction is determinative for tax purposes and not
form. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. z66r Corp., 377 F.2d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 1967). If the
form of the transaction were ignored, examination of the substance of the transaction would result in recognition of two debts, one created by an investor, the
other created by a corporate employee. If this type of apportionment were adopted
it would have to be applied in all cases involving shareholder-employees except
where taxpayer or the government could show one interest to be so insignificant as
to be indeterminable. The practical application of this apportionment theory would
require taxpayer to show significant motivation to protect his job before he would
be entitled to apportionment.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b)(2), T.D. 6728 (1964) states that the use to which the
proceeds of the loans are put is of no consequence in determining the "proximate
relation." But see note 28 supra.
r6In Generes much of the refusal of the circuit court to upset the district court's
finding was based on self-serving testimony of the taxpayer. 427 F.2d at 283-84.
But see Imbesi v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 64o, 644-45 (3 d Cir. 1966).

